

NOTICE.

A. S. WATSON & CO.
FAMILY AND DISPENSARY
CHEMISTS
By Appointment to His Excellency the GOVERNOR and His Royal Highness the DUKE OF EDINBURGH,
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL DRUGGISTS
PREPARERS
PATENT MEDICINE VENDORS
DRUGGISTS' SUNDRIES
AND
SERATED WATER MAKERS.
SHIPS MEDICINE CHESTS REFITTED
PASSENGER SHIPS SUPPLIED.

NOTICE.—To avoid delay in the execution of Orders it is particularly requested that all business communications be addressed to the FIRM, A. S. WATSON & CO.,
HONGKONG DISPENSARY, 121

NOTICE TO CORRESPONDENTS.
Correspondents are requested to forward their names and addresses with communications addressed to the Editor, not for publication, but as evidence of good faith.

All letters for publication should be written on one side of the paper only.
Advertisements and Subscriptions which are not ordered for a fixed period will be continued until discontinued.
Orders for extra copies of the Daily Press should be sent before 11 a.m. on the day of publication. After that hour the supply is limited.

The Daily Press

MARRIAGE.
On the 3rd instant, at the Roman Catholic Cathedral, by the Right Rev. Bishop of Hong Kong, FRANKLIN FROST, Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Captain, to MARGARET FROST, third daughter of the Hon. James FROST, of St. John, New Brunswick.

HONGKONG, FEBRUARY 10th, 1896.

In the concluding chapter of the article on

Colours in the *China Review* Messrs. COLGROVE and STEWART LOCKHART have some useful details drawn from the expulsion of the Dutch from that island which mark wider publicity and greater attention than the pages of a magazine can afford.

In the first place, referring to the Dutch hostilities with China prior to the establishment of the former in Formosa, they say:—"The Hollanders found that, though the Chinese were greatly inferior in warfare, their forces increased steadily in numbers the longer the operations were protracted, and therefore became more and more anxious to come to terms."

A compromise was offered by the Chinese, by the terms of which the Dutch were to evacuate the Pescadore and to occupy Formosa. History often repeats itself. The French have found the Chinese greatly inferior in the art of war, but they have also discovered, to their cost, that delay in their own operations, the failure to follow blow with blow, has only resulted in accumulating Chinese obstinacy, has dissipated the moral effect of the first successes gained by the French fleet, and has enabled China to develop a fighting power and resources which few persons thought she possessed. Unfortunately for France, her Government has throughout been unable to adopt a determined policy, and has feared to appeal to the country for the necessary supplies. The result has been half measures, reprisals which have aroused animosity and stirred up bitterness, but which have never cowed the Peking Government; failures at critical moments, when failure meant protraction of the war, owing to inadequate forces for following up attacks and losses, both in men and treasure, which are likely to prove the aggregate far greater than would have attended a large expedition like that sent by England during the last China War.

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As we stated recently, it would require at least ten thousand troops to garrison North Formosa alone, and it requires a larger fleet than Admiral Cochrane has at his command to render the blockade of the island effective. The want of good harbours in the island, the heavy seas always running in the Formosa Channel, and the exposed nature of the west coast, make the work of blockading Formosa most difficult and onerous. The dreadful vessels offered on board the vessels ordered in the blockade were alone sufficient to breed discontent among the crews, and the mutiny reported to have broken out on the flagship is not very astonishing under the circumstances. The forced inaction, the long suspense, the want of supplies, the constant buffeting on the restless seas, the miserable wet weather experienced, all combine to produce a condition of chronic discontent, especially as there are no compensations, neither glory nor loss being in prospect. The French Government are greatly to be blamed for giving Admiral Cochrane such a task as the occupation of Formosa and then withholding the necessary ships and troops for the work. It was a mistake in the first place to land at all in Formosa; it was a greater mistake to attempt the capture of Tamsui without a sufficient number of men; it was a blunder to declare a blockade of Formosa when they had not ships enough to enforce it; and it was a crowning act of folly to keep Admiral Cochrane waiting for months for reinforcements, which even now are but dribbling in, if at all.

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As we stated recently, it would require at least ten thousand troops to garrison North Formosa alone, and it requires a larger fleet than Admiral Cochrane has at his command to render the blockade of the island effective. The want of good harbours in the island, the heavy seas always running in the Formosa Channel, and the exposed nature of the west coast, make the work of blockading Formosa most difficult and onerous. The dreadful vessels offered on board the vessels ordered in the blockade were alone sufficient to breed discontent among the crews, and the mutiny reported to have broken out on the flagship is not very astonishing under the circumstances. The forced inaction, the long suspense, the want of supplies, the constant buffeting on the restless seas, the miserable wet weather experienced, all combine to produce a condition of chronic discontent, especially as there are no compensations, neither glory nor loss being in prospect. The French Government are greatly to be blamed for giving Admiral Cochrane such a task as the occupation of Formosa and then withholding the necessary ships and troops for the work. It was a mistake in the first place to land at all in Formosa; it was a greater mistake to attempt the capture of Tamsui without a sufficient number of men; it was a blunder to declare a blockade of Formosa when they had not ships enough to enforce it; and it was a crowning act of folly to keep Admiral Cochrane waiting for months for reinforcements, which even now are but dribbling in, if at all.

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LATEST TELEGRAMS.

LONDON, 9th February.

THE WAR IN TONQUIN.
A Cabinet Council held to-day in the presence of General Wolsey, *carte blanche* in proceeding with operations against the rebels, at the same time promising him every assistance.

The steamer *Conqueror*, General Wilson's force are reported to have returned from Kharnton and the troops have landed on an island. A steamer has been sent to bring them off.

LONDON, 9th February.

THE WAR IN TONQUIN.
The French troops are advancing on Langson and have carried a Chinese entrenched camp. They are now within two days' march of Langson.

SUPREME COURT.
9th February.

IN APPEAL.
BEFORE THE FULL COURT.
GEORGE B. STEVENS & CO. V. BORRELL & SONS.

The Attorney-General (Hos. E. L. O'Malley), instructed by Messrs. Wotton and Deacon, appeared for the appellants and submitted to the Court for permission to appeal to the Privy Council against the verdict of the jury found in the above case last December.

It will be remembered that the action was for damages in respect of a collision at sea between the steamer *Hungarian*, chartered by the plaintiffs from the defendants, as to her speed and carrying capacity. The jury awarded \$3,000 in damages in respect of the collision, and \$7,000 in respect of the carrying capacity. The defendants appealed to the Full Court for a rule setting aside the verdict of the jury in respect of the carrying capacity, but the application was dismissed, and the defendants now seek for permission to appeal to the Privy Council.

The Chief Justice (Mr. Justice Gavan Duffy) said that he had no objection to the appeal being allowed, and the case was remitted to the Privy Council.

The Attorney-General said that he had not; that was an appeal from a decision of the Full Court, and he had no objection to the appeal being allowed, and the case was remitted to the Privy Council.

His Lordship held that such notice was necessary, observing that the application might be opposed, and questions might arise as to what might be done with execution in the meantime. The matter was postponed.

POLICE COURT.
9th February.

BEFORE MR. A. G. WILKES.

DETENTION.
Edward Crook, a sailor, sailing from Messrs. Charles, pleaded guilty to having been drunk and incapable in Queen's-road on Sunday afternoon, and was fined half a dollar.

Samuel Anderson, a sailor, was fined \$10 for drunkenness and disorderly conduct on Queen's-road West on Sunday night. He was interfering with people in the street, and he had been a riot with some sailors.

LARCENY.
Yi Yan, cook on board the British steamer *Wellington*, admitted stealing 20 pounds of sugar from the ship on the 8th inst. He was fined \$10, and was sent to gaol for three days.

Choi Ayang, house cook, was sent to gaol for three days for stealing half a pound of bread at Messrs. Lane, Crawford & Co.

Wong Ah, a sailor, was fined \$10 for drunkenness and disorderly conduct on Queen's-road West on Sunday night. He was interfering with people in the street, and he had been a riot with some sailors.

POLICE PICKING UP A SAILOR.
James Lee, a sailor, was arrested on the 8th inst. for stealing 20 pounds of sugar from the ship on the 8th inst. He was fined \$10, and was sent to gaol for three days.

The complainant, who belongs to the crew of the *Wellington*, said that he saw the sugar on the 8th inst. He was fined \$10, and was sent to gaol for three days.

The National Police, who were on duty at the time, said that they saw the sugar on the 8th inst. He was fined \$10, and was sent to gaol for three days.

The defendant, who was a sailor, said that he saw the sugar on the 8th inst. He was fined \$10, and was sent to gaol for three days.

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a week for stealing a lamp-bag at the China Super Store on Saturday last. He was fined \$10, and was sent to gaol for three days.

George Borman, a sailor, was fined \$10 for having been drunk and incapable in the street on Saturday.

William McManus, a sailor, was fined \$10 for having been drunk and incapable in the street on Saturday.

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